ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the driving forces behind informal sanctions. We term sanctions to be informal if they are not imposed by formal, legal bodies but by private parties who punish other peoples' observed behaviors. Informal sanctions are important because the bulk of peoples' daily interactions is not governed by explicit, enforceable contracts but by implicit agreements and social norms. Informal sanctions typically enforce these agreements and norms (Francis 1985 , Ostrom 1990 , Hechter and Opp 2001 , Knez and Simester 2001 . In the light of previous evidence (Güth et al. 1982 , Roth 1995 , Fehr and Gächter 2000 it is not the question anymore whether there is informal sanctioning. The problem, which is not yet understood, however, is why people sanction and, in particular, why they sanction others' cooperative or defective behaviors. For this reason, we examined the motivational forces behind informal sanctions in a series of cooperation experiments. We conducted several three player prisoners' dilemma (PD) experiments with direct sanctioning opportunities, i.e., players had the option of sanctioning other group members after being informed of the latters' choices in the PD. We deliberately focused on games with more than two players because most past research examines rejection behavior in two player bargaining games, while social norms clearly extend beyond the context of bilateral interactions. 2 In addition, the examination of bilateral interactions cannot answer important questions regarding the nature of the fairness principles that drive informal sanctions. Thus, our limited understanding of the driving forces behind sanctions in multilateral interactions also implies a limited understanding of the relevant fairness principles.
Our experiments yield the following findings. First, if we average over all treatments, 63 percent of the subjects (N = 315) cooperate and 37 percent defect. Second, when cooperators punish, they almost exclusively penalize defectors. Third, when viewed through the lens of fairness theories, the share of defectors who punish is surprisingly large. These defectors impose roughly equal sanctions on cooperators and on (other) defectors. Fourth, the cooperators' sanctions are quantitatively much more important than those of the defectors because the percentage of cooperators who punish is much larger than the percentage of punishing defectors and cooperators' sanctions are much more severe at the individual level.
The pattern of individual sanctions is also related to a fifth result which we find particularly interesting. We implemented a high and a low sanction condition in our experiments. Every money unit spent on punishment reduced the punished individuals' payoff by 2.5 or 3 1/3 money units in the high sanction condition, while the same expenditure only reduced the punished individual's payoff by one money unit in the low sanction condition.
Thus, sanctioning was not associated with a change in the payoff difference between the punisher and the punished subject in the low sanction condition. We find that the sanctions of individual cooperators exceed those of individual defectors by a factor of almost three in the high sanction condition. Moreover, defectors' sanctions vanish completely in the low sanction condition, whereas the cooperators spend about 2.5 times more money on punishing defectors in the low than in the high sanction condition. These results suggest that cooperators have a very strong motive for sanctioning and that the desire to increase the payoff difference between the defector and the punished individual drives defectors' spiteful sanctions.
The observed punishment patterns also have implications for the validity of different theories of fairness (Rabin 1993 , Levine 1998 , Fehr and Schmidt 1999 , Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004 . One implication is that -with the exception of Levine's (1998) 213 subjects participated in a three player one-shot PD in the first two treatments. The payoff consequences of the cooperation decisions in the PD are presented in Table I. The table   demonstrates The treatments differ with regard to the parameter f. In the low-sanction treatment, f was set equal to 1. This treatment is useful because both theories of inequity aversion Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) as well as Levine's (1998) theory predict that no punishment will take place if f ≤ 1, while intention based reciprocity theories (Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and Fischbacher forthcoming) are consistent with punishment, even if it is equally costly or more costly for the punisher than for the punished. In addition, the low sanction treatment also enables us to study the nature of spiteful punishment in more detail.
Punishment was more effective in the high-sanction condition. The effectiveness of sanctions in the high-sanction treatment varied depending on whether i punished a cooperator or a defector. If i assigned one deduction point to a cooperator, the cooperator's payoff was reduced by 3 1/3 tokens (f = 3 1/3), whereas if i assigned a point to a defector, the defector's payoff was only reduced by 2.5 tokens (f = 2.5). In other words, the punishment of cooperators yielded the same payoff reduction at a lower cost. The main reason for this design feature was that fairness approaches, which neglect individual group members' payoffs and focus exclusively on the relation between a player's own payoff and the group's total or average payoff, predict that punishment should be exclusively targeted towards the cooperators if punishing cooperators is cheaper than punishing defectors. This contrasts sharply with most other fairness theories which predict that even if punishing cooperators is cheaper, sanctioning should be exclusively targeted towards the defectors.
Each group member made a contingent sanctioning decision at the punishment stage before being informed of the other players' decision at the cooperation stage. That is, each member assigned points to another member both for the case that the other member cooperated and that the other defected. This has the advantage of allowing us to collect much more information about subjects' sanctioning behavior. The contingent sanctioning decisions were made with the help of four decision screens. On each screen, i had to indicate whether he wanted to assign deduction points to no other player in the group, or to one or both of the other players and if so, how many points. The four screens represented the four possible choice combinations of the other two players: both of the other players defected, both cooperated, the second player cooperated while the third defected, and vice versa. After all three players had made their contingent sanctioning decisions, they were informed of the other players' behaviors at the cooperation stage and how much they themselves had been sanctioned. The entire procedure for making decisions at stage two was carefully explained to the subjects in the instructions. We also asked several hypothetical questions at the end of the instructions to check subjects' comprehension of the procedure. The experiment began after all subjects had solved all questions successfully.
In principle, it is possible that the elicitation of contingent responses (i.e., the "strategy method") induces different behaviors relative to a situation where the subjects face given, known cooperation decisions (i.e., the "specific response method"). However, Cason and Mui (1998) and Brandts and Charness (2000) report evidence indicating that contingent responses and the specific response method do not elicit different behaviors. Nevertheless, we also conducted the high sanction treatment with the specific response method to check for potential artifacts caused by the strategy method in our context. In this control experiment 102 subjects participated. They made their sanctioning decisions in the punishment stage of each period by responding to the actual cooperate/defect decisions of the players in the cooperation stage.
In all treatments, subjects did not know the personal identities of their interaction partners, and all interactions between the subjects were anonymous. 3 No subject participated in more than one treatment. The cooperation decision was always framed in terms of investments into a project. The punishment decision was framed as the assignment of deduction points to the other group members. We used this frame to avoid value laden terms such as "punishment"
or "sanction".
The subjects in all experiments described in this paper were undergraduate or graduate students from the University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.
All experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999) and conducted in the computer laboratory of the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics. The sessions with the strategy method lasted roughly 35 minutes and subjects earned CHF 25 (≈ $18.5) on average. The sessions with the specific response method also lasted 35 minutes and average earning per subject also was CHF 24.6 (≈ $18).
RESULTS
In this section, we first show how cooperators and defectors punish other cooperators and defectors (Section 3.1.). We then interpret these punishment patterns in light of preferences for fairness and spitefulness (Section 3.2.). Next, we present the results regarding the robustness of spiteful preferences when the specific response method is used to determine punishment (Section 3.3.). Finally, we discuss the implications of our results for the relevance of different fairness principles (Section 3.4.).
1. Who sanctions whom?
120 subjects participated in the high-sanction condition (f = 2.5 or 3.33) of our one-shot PD. 61 percent of them cooperated, and the remaining subjects defected. 93 subjects participated in the Second, the defectors also punish in the high sanction treatment, but they tend to punish both defectors and cooperators. This is indeed surprising when viewed through the lens of fairness theories. Moreover, the strength of the sanctions imposed on other defectors is almost the same as that of the sanctions imposed on cooperators, and defectors are equally likely to punish cooperators and defectors. The null hypothesis that defectors sanction other defectors and cooperators with the same probability cannot be rejected (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z = 1.34, p = 0.179). Third, the figures show that cooperators impose by far the strongest sanctions on defectors. The share of people in the different sanctioning categories is important for assessing the relevance of different motives behind the sanctions. Therefore, Table II Table II ) that more than two thirds of the cooperators in the high-sanction treatment punished in response to the violation of fairness principles while roughly 60 percent of the cooperators sanctioned for this reason in the low sanction treatment.
However, Table II also indicates that a large percentage of the defectors punished in the high sanction treatment. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the defectors' sanctioning behavior with any reasonable notion of fairness. After all, the defectors benefit from the cooperation of the others but refuse to bear "their" part of the cost in the investment project. Not only do these defectors benefit from the project without sharing the burden, they also sanction cooperators and other defectors. Therefore, the defectors' sanctions point towards motivational forces that most fairness theories have neglected so far. 4 It is difficult to rationalize the defectors' punishment of the cooperators except by assuming some form of spitefulness. In fact, a comparison of Figure 1a with Figure 1b suggests that a particular form of spitefulness drives the defectors' sanctions. Recall that a sanctioning defector can increase the payoff difference between himself and the sanctioned subject in the high-sanction condition because f > 1. In the low-sanction condition, however, any sanction leaves the payoff difference between the sanctioning and the sanctioned subject unchanged because f = 1. It is, therefore, striking that the percentage of defectors who punish is rather high in the highsanction condition but almost zero in the low-sanction condition. Only one defector (out of 46) punishes in the low-sanction condition. This pattern is consistent with spitefulness in the form of a desire to increase payoff differences between the punishing and the punished subject.
Are fairness driven sanctions or spiteful sanctions more important in our PD? There are two reasons why fairness-driven sanctions are more important. First, the sanctions that the cooperators impose on the defectors are much stronger than those the defectors impose on others. Second, the sanctioning cooperators prevail numerically over the sanctioning defectors.
A non-parametric Fisher exact test shows that the fraction of cooperators who sanction the defectors only is significantly higher (p < 0.001) than the fraction of defectors who sanction other players.
A Robustness Check
In this section, we report the results of the control treatment where the specific response method determined the sanctioning behavior. This treatment is designed to check whether the strategy method used in the first two treatments is responsible for some of the main results documented in the previous sections. In particular, the surprisingly large share of spiteful sanctions observed in Figure 1a and Table II Furthermore, there are no significant differences across elicitation methods with regard to the remaining sanctioning categories (C → C, D → C). Table II Figures 1a and 1c) .
Taken together, the evidence in this section suggests that -despite some important quantitative differences -the specific response method generates similar qualitative punishment patterns to the strategy method: (i) cooperators almost exclusively punish defectors; (ii) a significant fraction of the defectors punishes other players; (iii) cooperators impose by far the strongest sanctions on defectors.
4. The Relevance of different Fairness Principles
The results of the previous sections suggest that the fairness motive is the central motive behind informal sanctions, although spiteful sanctions were also surprisingly frequent. An understanding of the nature of the fairness principles that drive the sanctions is thus important.
We turn to this question next by discussing two fairness principles. The first principle relates to the question whether the other players' individual payoffs provide the empirically correct input for a player's fairness preferences or whether a summary indicator of the group's overall payoff such as the group's average or total payoff, constitutes the correct basis for a player's fairness preferences. The second principle relates to the question whether fairness driven sanctioning is motivated by the desire to retaliate, i.e., because the punishers want to harm those who committed unfair acts or whether the punishers want to minimize payoff inequities.
These two questions are closely related to the different fairness models. In several fairness theories (e.g., Levine 1998, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Falk and Fischbacher forthcoming) , a player's own material payoff and the other players' individual material payoffs provide the basis for a players' fairness preference. This contrasts with the approach by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) which assumes that the comparison between a player's own material payoff and the group's total payoff affects a player's preferences. A key feature of this approach is that the other players' individual material payoffs play no role for the construction of fairness preferences. 5 The answer to the second question separates the inequity aversion models Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) , which assume that players aim to minimize unfair payoff inequalities, from fairness models that are based on the retaliation motive (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and Fischbacher forthcoming) .
The pattern of punishment in our high sanction treatment can be used to answer the first question. If punishment is solely driven by a player's comparison of his own payoff with the total or the average payoff of the group, respectively, the player is indifferent between punishing a cooperator and punishing a defector if the costs of punishing them are identical.
The reason is that both the player's own material payoff as well as the group's total or average payoff is affected in the same way regardless of whether a cooperator or a defector is punished.
Thus, if the costs of punishing cooperators and defectors are identical, the approach by Bolton and Ockenfels predicts that cooperators and defectors are equally likely to be punished because the punishment target will be more or less determined randomly. Moreover, if punishing cooperators is cheaper than doing so to defectors, as is the case in our high sanction treatment, a punisher will always prefer to punish the cooperators because this is the cheaper way of affecting the total payoff. The data in our high sanction treatment sharply contradicts this prediction, however. In fact, the cooperators' sanctions were predominantly imposed on the defectors. 45 of the 73 cooperators punished the defectors exclusively, and 5 punished the other cooperators as well as the defectors. In addition, the defectors sanctioned cooperators and other defectors at the same rate although Bolton and Ockenfels predict preferential punishment of cooperators (see Figure 1a) . Taken together, these data suggest that fairness models that disregard the other players' individual payoffs and rely, instead, on a comparison with the group's total or average payoff, respectively, fail to explain decisive aspects of informal sanctions.
To answer the second question raised above, recall that a cooperator cannot reduce the payoff inequalities in the low sanction treatment, regardless of whether the inequalities are measured in terms of individual payoff differences, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , or whether they are measured in terms of the deviation of a player's relative payoff share from the fair relative share, as in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . Thus, theories of inequality aversion cannot explain why cooperators punish in the low sanction condition. Despite this, 59.6 percent of the cooperators punished the defectors (see Table II ). This suggests that the desire to retaliate, instead of the motive of reducing unfair payoff inequalities, seems to be the driving force of these sanctions. It is also remarkable that those cooperators who punish in the low-sanction condition impose on average almost the same payoff-reduction (8.0 tokens) as the cooperators who punish in the high-sanction condition (8.3 tokens). The small difference across conditions is not significant (Mann Whitney test, p = 0.395). Note that this means that a punishing cooperator in the low-sanction condition spends roughly 2.5 times more money on the punishment of the defectors than does a punishing cooperator in the high-sanction condition.
Thus, the retaliation motive behind the punishment of defectors in the low-sanction condition seems to be rather strong.
CONCLUSIONS
The willingness to sanction norm violations and non-cooperative behavior is crucial for the maintenance of social order. Such sanctions sustain the viability of a myriad of informal agreements in markets, organizations, families, and neighborhoods. In this paper, we examined the sanctioning motives in the context of a cooperation problem.
Our findings indicate that the most important category of sanctions -in terms of the percentage of individuals involved and in terms of the severity of the sanctions -are those which cooperators impose on defectors. We also find an unexpectedly large fraction of individuals who defect but nevertheless punish other group members. This spiteful punishment is somewhat reduced if the specific response method is used to determine sanctioning behavior. Meeting for helpful comments and discussions.
2 Exceptions are the experiments by Güth and van Damme (1998) and by Kagel and Wolfe (2001) , where three players participated in each of these experiments. However, the third player was completely passive. He could not make any choice, but the actions of the other two players affected his payoff. In our three person experiments all players have a non-trivial strategy set. In particular, each player can sanction any other player. Remark: Numbers in parentheses relate to the control treatment with the specific response method. All other numbers relate to the high or the low sanction treatment with the strategy method. 73 subjects cooperate and 47 defect in the high sanction condition with the strategy method whereas in the low sanction conditions 47 subjects cooperate and 46 defect. In the control treatment with the specific response method 79 subjects cooperate and 23 defect. 
